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We model an overlapping-generations economy with two skill levels: skilled and unskilled. 
The welfare-state is modeled simply by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a 
demogrant in a balanced-budget manner. Therefore, some (the unskilled workers and old 
retirees) are net beneficiaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled workers) are net 
contributors to it. Migration policies are set to determine the total migration volume and its 
skill composition.We characterize subgame-perfect Markov political-economic equilibria 
consisting of the tax rate (which determines the demogrant), skill composition and the total 
number of migrants. We distinguish between two voting behaviors: sincere and strategic 
voting. 
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1 Introduction
All over the world, the combination of declining population growth rates and rising life ex-
pectancy presents a major ﬁscal challenge to social security systems. From an economic
perspective, a rise in the dependency ratio (i.e., the proportion of retirees per worker) in-
creases the number of people drawing from the system; while it decreases the number of
contributors. From a political perspective, the older is the decisive voter, the more relevant
is the pension spending in the political agenda. One of the policy tools that are considered
for mitigating these politico-economic forces which result in higher demand for, and lower
supply of, social security beneﬁts is migration policy.
The view that increased migration may come to the rescue of PAYG social security sys-
tems reﬂects the fact that the ﬂow of migrants can alleviate the current demographic imbal-
ance, by inﬂuencing the age structure of the host economy. A few empirical studies address
this point by calibrating the equilibrium impact of a less restrictive policy towards migration
according to U.S. data. Storesletten (2000) ﬁnds in a general equilibrium model that selec-
tive migration policies, involving increased inﬂow of working-age high and medium-skilled
migrants, can remove the need for a future ﬁscal reform. By emphasizing the demographic
side and abstracting from the migrants’ factor prices eﬀects, Lee and Miller (2000) conclude
in a similar analysis that a higher number of migrants admitted into the economy can ease
temporarily the projected ﬁscal burden of retiring baby boomers.
This paper combines two ﬁelds of the existing political economy literature, which have
not been examined jointly, to our knowledge: the political economy of the PAYG social
security systems (Cooley and Soares (1999), Bohn (2005), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000),
Galasso (1999)) and the political economy of migration (Benhabib (1997)). There are also
a few studies which deal with the eﬀect of migrants on the PAYG social security system
(Razin and Sadka (1999) and Scholten and Thum (1996)). This paper addresses the joint
political economy decisions regarding both migration policy and social security policy in a
dynamic set-up.
The paper develops a dynamic politico-economic model, in which both migration and
taxes interact, focusing on inter- and intra-generational aspect of social security. The model
is based on key demographic characteristics: that migrants are younger and have higher birth
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rates than the native born population. To isolate the inter-generational aspects, we abstract
in this chapter from intra-generational income transfers considerations. .A standard dynamic
equilibrium concept is employed in which migration policy and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social
security system are jointly determined through a majority voting process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses evidence for the ﬁscal burden of
migration. Section 2 presents the analytical framework. Section 3 characterizes the political-
economy equilibrium under sincere voting. Section 4 characterizes the political-economy
equilibrium under strategic voting. Section 5 concludes.
2 Fiscal Aspects of Migration: Evidence
The European Union, both "old" (EU-15) and "new" (after the enlargement to EU-27),
faces a severe aging problem. For instance the ratio of the elderly population (aged 60 years
and over) to the working age population (aged 15-59 years) in the EU-15 is projected to
at least double from about 20% in the year 2000 to over 40%, in the year 2050. Oﬃcial
retirement ages have failed to keep up with life expectancy, making pensions and health care
provisions increasingly unaﬀordable."Many people in the rich-world OECD countries retire
relatively early, which let them enjoy, on average, some 19 years in retirement before death."
(The Economist, February 2nd, 2010). Years in retirement in Italy, Austria and France
are 23, 24 and 25, respectively. The aging process shakes the ﬁnancial soundness of the
welfare state, especially its old-age security and medical health components, because there
are fewer workers asked to support increasing numbers of retirees. As put metaphorically
by the Economist (March 15th, 2003, 80):..."the ﬁscal burden on the diminishing number
of worker-bees will rise as more people turn into pensioner drones." The Economist (24th
August, 2002) also looks at some of the dimensions of the ﬁnancial burden: "On some
estimates, by 2050, government debt could be equivalent to almost 100 percent of national
income in America, 150 percent in the EU as a whole [EU-15] and over 250 percent in
Germany and France." Nevertheless, note that migration of young workers (as distinct from
retirees), even when driven by the generosity of the welfare state, slows down the trend
of increasing the dependency ratio. However, economic intuition suggests that even though
unskilled migration improves the dependency ratio, it nevertheless burdens the welfare state.
This is because low-skill migrants are typically net beneﬁciaries of the generosity of the
welfare state. Indeed, in 1997 the U.S. National Research Council sponsored a study on
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the overall ﬁscal impact of immigration into the U.S.; see Edmonston and Smith (1997).
The study looks comprehensibly at all layers of government (federal, state, and local), all
programs (beneﬁts), and all types of taxes. For each cohort, deﬁned by age of arrival to
the U.S., the beneﬁts (cash or in kind) received by migrants over their own lifetimes and
the lifetimes of their ﬁrst-generation descendents were projected. These beneﬁts include
Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income (SSI), Aid for Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), food stamps, Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), etc.
Similarly, taxes paid directly by migrants and the incidence on migrants of other taxes (such
as corporate taxes) were also projected for the lifetimes of the migrants and their ﬁrst-
generation descendents. Accordingly, the net ﬁscal burden was projected and discounted to
the present. In this way, the net ﬁscal burden for each age cohort of migrants was calculated in
present value terms. Within each age cohort, these calculations were disaggregated according
to three educational levels: Less than high school education, high school education, and more
than high school education. The ﬁndings suggest that migrants with less than high school
education are typically a net ﬁscal burden that can reach as high as approximately US-
$100,000 in present value, when the migrants’ age on arrival is between 20—30 years.
Following the recent enlargement of the European Union to 27 countries there were
concerns that the EU-15 was likely to face a rise in welfare migration. Hans-Werner Sinn
(Financial Times, July 12th 2004) made a somewhat alarming prediction:
"There will be more migration in Europe, but it will be ’bad’ migration as well
as ’good’.’Good’ migration is driven by wage and productivity diﬀerence. ’Bad’
migration is driven by generosity of the welfare state."
Nevertheless, only three members of the EU-15 (the UK, Sweden and Ireland) allowed
free access for residents of the accession countries to their national labor markets, in the
year of the ﬁrst enlargement, 2004. The other members of the EU-15 took advantage of
the clause that allows for restricted labor markets for a transitional period of up to seven
years. Focusing on the UK and the A8 countries1, Dustmann at al (2009) bring evidence
of no welfare migration. The average age of the A8 migrants during the period 20042-2008
is 25.8 years, considerably lower than the native U.K. average age (38.7 years). The A8
migrants are also better educated than the natives. For instance, the percentage of those
1 The A8 countries are the ﬁrst eight accession countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Slovenia and Poland.)
2 More accurately, the said period extends from the second quarter of 2004 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
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that left full-time education at the age of 21 years or later is 35.5 among the A8 migrants,
compared to only 17.1 among the U.K. natives. Another indication that the migration
is not predominantly driven by welfare motives is the higher employment rate of the A8
migrants (83.1%) relative to the U.K. natives (78.9%). Furthermore, for the same period,
the contribution of the A8 migrants to government revenues far exceeded the government
expenditures attributed to them. A recent study by Barbone et al (2009), based on the
2006 European Union Survey of Income and Living conditions, ﬁn d st h a tm i g r a n t sf r o mt h e
accession countries constitute only 1-2 percent of the total population in the pre-enlargement
EU countries (excluding Germany and Luxemburg); by comparison about 6 percent of the
population in the latter EU countries were born outside the enlarged EU. The small share of
migrants from the accession countries is, of course, not surprising in view of the restrictions
imposed on migration from the accession countries to the EU-15 before the enlargement
and during the transition period after the enlargement. The study shows also that there
is, as expected, a positive correlation between the net current taxes (that is, taxes paid less
beneﬁts received) of migrants from all source countries and their education level3.
Indeed the general public perceives unskilled migrants as a drain on the public ﬁnance.
In the U.K., the Daily Mirror (24 July, 2006) puts it bread and butter terms: "Economic
migrants need schools for their children. They need housing .They need medical care. They
can even lose their jobs."
Not unexpectedly, employing opinion surveys, Hanson et al (2007) bring evidence that
in the United States native residents of states which provide generous beneﬁts to migrants
also prefer to reduce the number of migrants. Furthermore, the opposition is stronger among
higher income groups. Similarly, Hanson et al (2009), again employing opinion surveys, ﬁnd
for the United States that native-born residents of states with a high share of unskilled
migrants, among the migrants population, prefer to restrict in migration; whereas native-
born residents of states with a high share of skilled migrants among the migrant population
are less likely to favor restricting migration4. Indeed, developed economies do attempt to
sort out immigrants by skills (see, for instance, Bhagwati and Gordon (2009)). Australia
and Canada employ a point system based on selected immigrants’ characteristics. The U.S.
employs explicit preference for professional, technical and kindred immigrants under the so-
called third-preference quota. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) ﬁnd that both the Australian
3 See also Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002)
4 See also Mayda (2006)
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and American selection mechanisms are eﬀective in sorting out the skilled migrants, and
produce essentially similar outcomes despite of their diﬀerent legal characteristics.
3 Analytical Framework
We employ a two-period, overlapping-generations model. The old cohort retires, while the
young cohort works. There are two skill levels: skilled and unskilled. The welfare-state is
modeled simply as in Part I of the book, by a proportional tax on labor income to ﬁnance a
demogrant or public service in a balanced-budget manner.5 Therefore, some (the unskilled
workers and old retirees) are net beneﬁciaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled
workers) are net contributors to it. Migration policies are set to determine the total migration
volume and its skill composition. As in Chapter 5, we characterize subgame-perfect Markov
politico-economic equilibria consisting of the tax rate (which determines the demogrant),
skill composition and the the total number of migrants. We distinguish between two voting
behaviors: sincere and strategic voting (see Appendix).
3.1 Preferences and Technology

























where, as in Part I, s and u denote skilled and unskilled labor. Here, y and o denote to
young and old, li is labor, ε is the elasticity of the labor supply, and β ∈ (0,1) is the
discount factor.6 Note that co
t is the consumption of an old individual at period t (who was
born in period t − 1). Agents in the economy maximize the above utility functions subject
to their respective budget constraints. Given the linearity of U in ct and ct+1, a non-corner
solution can be attained on only when 1=β(1+r), where r is the interest rate. We indeed
assume that the interest rate r equal 1
β −1 and individuals have no incentive to either save or
dissave. Fore simplicity, we set saving at zero.7 This essentially reduces the two groups of old
5 We draw heavily on Suwankiri (2009).
6 This functional form of Uy is similar to the one used in Part I.
7 In fact, any saving level is an optimal choice. Assuming no saving is for pure convenience. With saving,
since old individuals do not work the last period of their life, they will consume savings plus any transfer.
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retirees (skilled and unskilled) to just one because they have identical preference irrespective
of their skill level. In addition to consumption, the young also decide on how much labor to







¢ε ,i = s,u (3)
where wi is the wage rate of a worker of skill level i = s,u.
There is just one good, which is produced by using the two types of labor as perfect









t is the aggregate labor supply of skill i = s,u. Labor markets are competitive,
ensuring the wages going to the skilled and unskilled workers are indeed equal to their
marginal products, ws and wu, respectively. We naturally assume that ws >w u.
As before, we denote the demogrant by bt and the tax rate by τt. The agents in the
economy take these policy variables as given when maximizing their utilities. Because the
old generation has no income, its only source of income comes from the demogrant. The






+ bt + βbt+1
V
o = bt,
for i ∈ {s,u}. For brevity, we will use V i to denote V y,i because only the young workers
need to be distinguished by their skill level.
In addition to the parameters of the welfare state (τt and, consequently, bt), the political
process also determines migration policy. This policy consists of two parts: one determining
the volume of migration, and the other its skill composition. We denote by µt the ratio
of allowed migrants to the native-born young population and denote by σt the fraction of
skilled migrants in the the total number of migrant entering the country in period t.
Migrants are assumed to have identical preference to the native-born. As before, we
assume all migrants come young and they are naturalized one period after their entrance.
Through both these channels, the old individuals beneﬁt from migration. To keep the analysis short, we will
just focus on the costs and beneﬁts in terms of the welfare state.
8 This simpliﬁcation, nonetheless, allows us to focus solely on the linkages between the welfare state and
migration, leaving aside any labor market consideration. In Appendix 7A.1, we consider the case where the
two inputs are not perfect substitute.
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Hence, they gain voting rights when they are old, as in the inter-generational model of
chapter 5.
As in chapters 2 and 3, let st denote the fraction of native-born skilled workers in the
labor force in period t (where s0 > 0). The aggregate labor supply in the economy of each
type of labor is given by
L
s






t =[ 1− st +( 1− σt)µt]Ntl
u
t , (6)
where Nt is the number of native-born young individuals in period t.
3.2 Dynamics
The dynamics of the economy are given by two dynamic equations: one governs the aggregate
population, while the other governs the skill composition dynamics. Because skills are not
endogenous within the model, we assume for simplicity that the oﬀspring replicate exactly
the skill level of their parents.9 That is,
Nt+1 =[ 1+n +( 1+m)µt]Nt (7)
st+1Nt+1 =[ ( 1+n)st +( 1+m)σtµt]Nt,
where n and m are the population growth rates of the native-born population and the
migrants, respectively. As in chapter 5, we plausibly assume that n<m , and we allow the
population growth rates to be negative. Combining the two equations in (7) together, we
get the dynamics of the labor supply of skilled native-born as follows:
st+1 =
(1 + n)st +( 1+m)σtµt
1+n +( 1+m)µt
. (8)
Equation (8) implies that the fraction of the native-born skilled in the native-born labor
force will be higher in period t +1than in period t if the proportion of skilled migrants in
period t is higher than that of the native-born, that is, if σt >s t. Naturally, when there
is no migration the share of skilled workers out of (native-born) young population does not
change over time, by assumption. When migration is allowed and its share of skilled labor
9 Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002a, 2002b) and Casarico and Devillanova (2003) provide a synthesis with
endogeneous skill analysis. The ﬁrst work focuses on the shift in skill distribution of current population,
while the latter studies skill-upgrading of future population.
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is larger than that of the native-born, the share of skilled labor in the population will grow
over time.
3.3 The Welfare-State System
As before, we model the welfare-state system as balanced period-by-period. In essence, it
operates like a pay-as-you-go system. The proceeds from the labor tax of rate τt in period
t serve entirely to ﬁnance the demogrant bt in the same period. Therefore, the equation for
the demogrant, bt,i sg i v e nb y
bt =
τt ((st + σtµt)wsNtls
t +( 1− st +( 1− σt)µt)wuNtlu
t )






which upon some manipulation reduces to
bt =
τt ((st + σtµt)wsls






where the individual’s labor supplies are given above in equation (3). It is straightforward to
see that a larger σt increases the demogrant (recall that wsls
t >w ulu
t ). That is, a higher skill
composition of migrants brings about higher tax revenues, and, consequently, enables more
generous welfare state, other things being equal. Similarly, upon diﬀerentiation of bt with
respect to µt, we can conclude that a higher volume of migration enables a more generous
welfare system if the share of the skilled among the migrants exceeds the share of the skilled
among the native-born workers (σt >s t).
3.4 Political Economy Equilibrium: Sincere Voting
In this section, we study the politico-economic equilibrium in the model. We imagine the
economy with three candidates representing each group of voters. In the text, we discuss
only the equilibrium with sincere voting.
We begin our analysis with "sincere voting", where individuals vote according to their
sincere preference irrespective of what the ﬁnal outcome of the political process will be. In
this case, the outcome of the voting is determined by the largest voting group.10 Therefore,
it is important to see who forms the largest voting group in the economy and under what
conditions. Note that there are only three voting groups: the skilled native-born young, the
10Evidently, this assumption amounts to majority voting when there are only two voting groups.
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unskilled native-born young, and the old (recall that there is no saving, so that all the old
care only about the size of the demogrant and thus have identical interest.
1. The group of skilled native-born workers is the largest group ("the skilled group") under
two conditions. First, its size must dominates the unskilled young, and, second, it must








1+n + µt−1(1 + m)
(12)
, respectively. It can be shown that, because n<m≤ 1, only the second of the two
conditions is suﬃcient.
2. The group of unskilled native-born workers is the largest group ("the unskilled group")
under two similar conditions; that are reduced to just one:
1 − st >
1+µt−1
1+n + µt−1(1 + m)
. (13)
3. The group of old retirees is the largest group ("the old group"), when its size is larger
than each one of the former groups, that is,
1+µt−1
1+n + µt−1(1 + m)
≥ max{st,1 − st}. (14)
3.5 Equilibrium
We ﬁrst describe what are the variables relevant for each of the three types of voters when
casting the vote in period t. First, st i st h ev a r i a b l ew h i c hd e s c r i b e st h es t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m y .
Also, each voter takes into account how her choice of the policy variables in period t will
aﬀect the chosen policy variables in period t +1which depends on st+1 (recall that the
beneﬁts h ew i l lg e ti np e r i o dt +1 , bt+1, depends on τt+1,σt+1,a n dµt+1). Therefore each
voter will cast her vote on the set of policy variables τt,σt,a n dµt which maximizes her
utility given the values of st, taking also into account how this will aﬀect st+1. Thus, there is
a link between the policy chosen in period t to the one chosen in period t+1.T h eo u t c o m e
of the voting is the triplet of the policy variables most preferred by the largest voting group.
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The mechanism (policy rule or function) that characterizes the choice of the policy vari-
ables (τt, σt,a n dµt) is invariant over time. This mechanism relates the choice in any period
to the choice of the preceding period (τt−1, σt−1,a n dµt−1). This choice depend also on
the current state of the economy, st. Thus, we are looking for a triplet policy function
(τt,σ t,µ t)=Φ(st,τt−1,σ t−1,µ t−1), which is a solution to the following functional equation
Φ(st,τt−1,σ t−1,µ t−1)=a r gm a x
τt,σt,µt
V
d {st,τt,σt,µ t,Φ(st+1,τt,σt,µ t)} (15)
s.t. st+1 =
(1 + n)st +( 1+m)σtµt
1+n +( 1+m)µt
,
where V d is deﬁned in equations (7.5) and (7.11), and d ∈ {s,u,o} is the identity of the
largest voting group in the economy.
This equation states that the decisive (largest) group in period t chooses, given the
state of the economy st, the most preferred policy variables τt,σt, and µt.I n d o i n g s o ,
this group realizes that her utility is aﬀected not only by these (current) variables, but
also the policy variables of the next period (τt+1,σ t+1,µ t+1). This group further realizes
that the future policy variables are aﬀected by the current variables according to the policy
function Φ(st+1,τt,σ t,µ t). Furthermore, this inter-temporal functional relationship between
the policy variables in periods t+1and t i s t h es a m ea st h eo n ee x i s t e db e t w e e np e r i o dt and
t − 1. Put diﬀerently, what the decisive group in period t chooses is related to st,τt−1,σt−1,
and µt−1 in exactly the same way (through Φ(·))a sw h a tt h ed e c i s i v eg r o u pi np e r i o dt +1
is expected to be related to st+1,τt,σt, and µt.
Denoting the policy function, Φ(st,τt−1,σt−1,µ t−1),b y(τt,σt,µ t), we can show that the
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, if the unskilled group is the largest
1
1+ε , if the old group is the largest
σt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1
, if either the skilled or unskilled group
is the largest and st < 1
1+n
b σ<1
2 , if the skilled group is the largest and st ≥ 1
1+n




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1−(1+n)st
m
, if the unskilled group is the largest and Ψ > 0 or
if the skilled group is the largest and st < 1
1+n
b µ<1 , if the skilled group is the largest and st ≥ 1
1+n
1
, if the unskilled group is the largest and Ψ ≤ 0



















t+1 −b bt, (18)
w h e r ew ed e n o t eb yb bt the demogrant period t with µt =1=σt,a n dbu
t the demogrant in
period t with σt =1and µt =
1−(1+n)st
m (both demogrants are associated with the tax rate
preferred by the unskilled group). Similarly, bo
t+1 is the demogrant in period t+1associated
with the set of policy variables preferred by the old group.
Notice that the case st > 1
1+n cannot happen if the unskilled group is the largest (because
n<1). In this case, the special migration policy variables preferred by the skilled group, b σ,
and b µ, are given implicitly from the maximization exercise












s. t. (1 + n)st − 1 ≤ µt(1 − (1 + m)σt).






b µ(1 + m)
(1 + m)b σ − 1
. (20)
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3.6 Interpretation: Migration and Tax Policies
The intuition for the aforementioned results is as follows. The skilled are the net contributor
to the welfare state, while the other two groups are net beneﬁciaries. Preferences of the
old retirees are simple. If the old cohort is the largest, it wants maximal social security
beneﬁts, which means taxing to the Laﬀer point ( 1
1+ε). They also allow the maximal number
of skilled migrants in to the economy because of the tax contribution this generates to the
welfare system.
It is interesting to note that, although the unskilled young are net beneﬁciaries in this
welfare state, they are, nevertheless, still paying taxes. Hence the preferred tax policy of the
unskilled voters is smaller than the Laﬀer point with a wedge 1
J. (We will provide further
discussions on this deviation factor below.) Clearly, the unskilled workers also prefer to let in
more skilled immigrants due to their contribution to the welfare state. How many will they
let in depends on the function Ψ, which weighs the future beneﬁts against the cost at the
present. Basically, if the unskilled workers are not forward-looking, it is in their best interest
to let in as many skilled migrants as possible. However, this will lead to no redistribution
in the next period because the skilled workers will be the largest. Hence, the function Ψ is
the diﬀerence between the beneﬁts they get by being, as they are, forward-looking and being
myopic.
The skilled native-born prefer more skilled migrants for a diﬀerent reason than the earlier
two groups. They prefer to let in skilled migrants in this case because this will provide a
higher number of skilled native workers in the next period. Thus, because the skilled are
forward-looking, they too will prefer to have more skilled workers in their retirement period.
However, they cannot let in too many of them because their high birth rate may render the
skilled young in the next period as the largest group who will vote to abolish the welfare
state altogether (similar to chapter 5).
A common feature among models with subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium is the idea
that today’s voters have the power to inﬂuence the identity of future policy makers. Such
f e a t u r ei sa l s op r o m i n e n ti no u ra n a l y s i sh e r e( a sw e l la si nc h a p t e r5 ) . T h em i g r a t i o n
policy of either young group reﬂects the fact that they may want to put themselves as the
largest group in the next period. Thus, instead of letting in too many migrants, who will
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give birth to a large new skilled generation, they will want to let in as much as possible
before the threshold is crossed. This threshold is
1−(1+n)st
m . Letting st =1gets the result
of the chapter. There are two diﬀerences between this threshold and the one in chapter 5.
F i r s t ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u mh e r eh a sab i t ee v e ni ft h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t ei spositive,w h i c h
cannot be done when there are only young and old cohort, as in chapter 5, unless there
is a negative population growth rate. Another fundamental is that, in order to have some
transfer in the economy, the young decisive largest group has a choice of placing the next
period’s decisive power either in the hand of next period’s unskilled or the old. So we need
to verify an additional condition that it is better for this period’s decisive young to choose
the old generation next period, which is the case.
When st ≥ 1
1+n, we have a unique situation (which is only possible when n>0). In this
range of values, the number of skilled is growing too fast to be curbed by reducing migration
volume alone. To ensure that the decisive power lands in the right hand (that is, the old),
the skilled voters (who are the largest in this period) must make the unskilled cohort grow
to weigh down the growth rate of the skilled workers. This is done by restricting both the
skill composition as well as the size of total migration.11
The tax choice of the unskilled young deserves an independent discussion. In Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002a, 2002b), it is maintained that the "ﬁscal leakage" to the native-
born and to the migrants who are net beneﬁciaries may result in a lower tax rate chosen by
the median voter. They assume that all migrants possess lower skill than the native-born.
Because this increases the burden on the ﬁscal system, the median voter vote to reduce the
size of the welfare state, instead of increasing it. To see such a resemblance the our result,
we must ﬁrst take the migration volume, µt, and the skill composition, σt, as given. Letting
τu




∂σt > 0, and there exists σ such that, for any σt < σ,w eh a v e
∂τu
t
∂µt < 0. Conversely,
for any σt > σ, we would get an expansion of the welfare state, because
∂τu
t
∂µt > 0.12 The
11Empirically, with the population growth rate of the major host countries for migration like the U.S. and
Europe going below 1%, it is unlikely that this case should ever be of much concern. Barro and Lee (2000)
provides an approximation of the size of the skilled. While Barro and Lee statistics capture those 25 years
and above, they also cite OECD statistics which capture age group between 25 and 64. The percentage of
this group who received tertiary education or higher in developed countries falls in the range of 15% to 47%.
12Recall that the tax rate preferred by the unskilled young workers is less than the level that is preferred
by the old retirees. The tax rate preferred by the old retirees, τo
t = 1
1+ε is the Laﬀer point that attains the
maximum welfare size, given immigration policies. Therefore the size of the welfare state is monotonic in
the tax rate when τ ∈ [0, 1
1+ε]. Thus, our use of "shrink" and "expand" is justiﬁed.
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inequalities tell us that higher number of skilled migrants will prompt a higher demand for
intra-generational redistribution. The ﬁscal leakage channel shows that unskilled migration
creates more ﬁscal burden, such that the decisive "unskilled" voters would rather have the





t , leads to a larger welfare state demanded by the unskilled.
4 Strategic Voting Equilibrium
We now turn to strategic voting. Recall that we have only three groups: the skilled native-
born, the unskilled native-born, and the old. Let the set of three candidates be {s,u,o},
denoting their identity. Then, as in Chapter 6, the decision to vote of any individual must be
optimal under the correctly anticipated probability of winning and policy stance of each can-
didate. Because identical voters vote identically, we can focus on the decision of a represen-
tative voter from each group. Let ei
t ∈ {s,u,o} be the vote of individual of type i ∈ {s,u,o}





form a voting equilibrium at time t if
e
i∗
























for i ∈ {s,u,o},w h e r ePj(ei
t,e∗
−it) denotes the probability that candidate j ∈ {s,u,o} will
win given the voting decisions, and e∗
−it is the optimal voting decision of other groups that












is the policy vector if candidate j w i n s .T h u sw er e q u i r et h a t
each vote cast by each group is a best-response to the votes by the other groups. In addition,
the representative voter of each group must take into the account the pivotal power of their
vote, because the entire group will also vote accordingly. The voting decision of the old
voters is simple, because they have no concern for the future,
e
o∗


























After the election, the votes are tallied by adding up the size of each group that have chosen
to vote for the candidate. The candidate with the most votes wins the election and gets to
implement his ideal set of policies.
14Migration and the Welfare State: Dynamic Political-Economy Theory
Clearly, each individual prefers the ideal policies of their representative candidate. Strate-
gic voting opens up the possibility of voting for someone else that is not the most preferred
candidate in order to avoid the least favorable candidate. For the skilled young, they prefer
the least amount of taxes and some migration for the future. Thus, they will prefer the
policy choice of the unskilled over the old candidate. As for the old retirees, the higher the
transfer beneﬁts, the better. Clearly, the unskilled candidate promises some beneﬁts whereas
the skilled promises none, so they would choose the policies of the unskilled over the skilled.
As for the unskilled workers, both rankings are possible: either they prefer the policy
choice of the skilled over the old, or vice versa. The parameters of the model will dictate the
direction of their votes. The cut-oﬀ tax policy, e τ,i st h eb r e a k - e v e np o i n tf o rt h eu n s k i l l e d
between getting taxed but receiving transfer (policies of the old candidate) or pay no tax at










e τ(1 − e τ)ε ¡
(st + σtµt)(ws)






We know that such a tax policy exists, because, take next period’s policy as given, the
payoﬀ in this period to the unskilled is maximized at its preferred policy and zero at τ =1 .
Therefore, at some e τ, the equality will hold. This cut-oﬀ tax rate will play an important
role for the unskilled young’ voting decision.
T h em a i np r o b l e mw i t hr a n k i n gt h eu t i l i t ys t r e a m so ft h ev o t e r si sd u et ot h em u l t i p l i c i t y
of future equilibria once we extend our work to strategic voting. This makes it impossible
for the voters to get a precise prediction of what will happen as a result of their action today.
Even if we could pin down all the relative sizes of all possible payoﬀs in the next period,
multiple voting equilibria do not allow a prediction of which equilibrium will be selected
in the future. To deal with the problem, we restrict the voting equilibrium to satisfy the
stationary Markov-perfect property, similarly to the policy choices in previous subsection.
Now, we are ready to deﬁne the subgame-perfect Markov political equilibrium under strategic
voting. We are looking for the a triplet policy function (τt,σ t,µ t)=Φ(st,τt−1,σ t−1,µ t−1,e∗
t)
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with the voting vector e∗
t that solve the following two problems:
Φ(st,τt−1,σt−1,µ t−1,e
∗
t)=a r gm a x
τt,σt,µt
V




(1 + n)st +( 1+m)σtµt
1+n + µt(1 + m)
,
where d ∈ {s,u,o} is the identity of the the winning candidate, decided by the voting
equilibrium e∗

































−it) denotes the winning probability of the representative candidate j ∈ {s,u,o}
given the voting decisions, and e∗













is the vector of preferred policy of candidate from group j.
The stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium deﬁned above introduces another functional
equation exercise. The ﬁrst exercise is to ﬁnd a policy proﬁle that satisﬁes the usual Markov-
perfect deﬁnition, as discussed in the case of sincere voting in the text. The second exercise
restricts the voting decision to be cast on the belief that individuals in the same situation next
period will vote in exactly the same way. With this property, the voters in this period know
exactly how future generations will vote and can evaluate the stream of payoﬀs accordingly.
Lastly, the keep the analysis simple, we focus on voting equilibria that are consistent with
policies derived in the text for the case of sincerely voting. This will be the case if the policies
are always coupled with a voting equilibrium featuring the largest group always voting for
its representative candidate. In particular, if the group forms the absolute majority, all votes
cast from this group will go to its representative candidate. The economy can go through
diﬀerent equilibrium paths depending on n, m,a n ds0, as follows:
1. If n + m ≤ 0,t h eo l dg r o u pi sa l w a y st h ea b s o l u t em a j o r i t y .T a xr a t ei sa tt h eL a ﬀer
point and the economy is fully open to skilled migration.




1+n, then the skilled workers are the majority (controlling 50% of the population),
and zero tax rate with limited skilled migration will be observed. If n
2(1+n) ≥ s0,t h e
unskilled workers are the majority, then there will be a positive tax rate (less than at
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the Laﬀer point) and some skilled migration. If n<0,t h e ninitially the old cohort is
the majority; the tax rate will be at the Laﬀer point and the skilled migration will be
maximal. Otherwise, the policies implemented are given in the equilibrium below.
The ﬁrst equilibrium we look at is dubbed "Intermediate" because it captures the essence
that the preferred policies of the unskilled workers are a compromise from the extremity of the
other two groups. We can show that the following strategy proﬁle forms a subgame-perfect


















1+n+µt−1(1+m) ≥ max{st,1 − st}
u, otherwise








,σt =1 ,µ t =




where J = J(µt,σt,s t,µ t−1) is as in equation (17).
The equilibrium features the unskilled voters always voting for their representative,
whereas the other two groups vote for their respective candidate only if they are the largest
group, or for the unskilled candidate otherwise. With these voting strategy, if no group cap-
tures 50% of the voting populations, the policy choice preferred by the unskilled candidate
will prevail. One notable diﬀerence is the policy related to the immigration volume. In period
t +1 , as long as the skilled workers do not form 50% of the voting population, the policies
preferred by the unskilled workers will be implemented. To make sure that this is the case,
skilled migration is restricted to just the threshold that would have put the skilled voters as
t h ea b s o l u t em a j o r i t yi np e r i o dt +1 . The volume of migration, µ∗
t =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m ,r e ﬂects
the fact that the threshold value for this variable has been pushed slightly farther. This level
can be shown to be higher than the restricted volume in sincerely voting equilibrium.
In the preceding equilibrium, we let the preference of the skilled workers and the old
retirees decide the fate of the policies. In the following analysis, the unskilled workers
consider who they want to vote for. This will depend on how extractive the tax policy
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preferred by old is. We call the next equilibrium "Left-wing", because it features a welfare
state of the size greater-than-or-equal to that of the intermediate policy equilibrium. This
may arise when the tax rate preferred by the old voters is not excessively to redistributive.
When 1





s ,o t h e r w i s e
u, if
1+µt−1























































where J = J(µt,σt,s t,µ t−1) is as in equation (17) and e τ is given implicitly in equation (22).
When the tax rate preferred by the old voters is not excessively redistributive in the eyes
of the unskilled, we could have an equilibrium where the unskilled voters strategically vote
for the old candidate to avoid the policies preferred by the skilled voters. This will be an
equilibrium when the size of the skilled is not "too large." Recall that, voting to implement
the policies selected by the old candidate leads to opening the economy fully to the skilled
immigrants. If the size of the skilled group is currently too large, there is a risk of making
the skilled voters the absolute majority in the next period and will result in no welfare state
in the retirement of this period’s workers. The cutoﬀ l e v e lb e f o r et h i sh a p p e n si sg i v e nb y
1+ n−m
2
1+n . Therefore, voting for the old will only be compatible with the interest of the unskilled
voters when the tax rate is not excessively high and when the size of the skilled is not too
large.
We turn our attention to the next equilibrium. When 1
1+ε > e τ, we can show that there
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where J = J(µt,σt,s t,µ t−1) is as in equation (17) and e τ is given in equation (22).
When the Laﬀer point is higher than e τ, the tax rate is read as excessive. In this case, the
unskilled voters will instead choose to vote for the skilled over the old candidate. The result-
ing equilibrium as the size of the welfare state less-than-or-equal to that in the intermediate
policy equilibrium, hence we refer to it as "Right-wing." When the tax preferred by the old
is excessive from the perspective of the unskilled, the political process could implement the
policies preferred by the skilled in order to avoid the worst possible outcome. This happens
when the old voters constitute the largest group, and the unskilled voters vote strategically
for the skilled candidate. In other cases, however, the policies preferred by the unskilled will
be implemented, irrespective of the identity of the largest group in the economy.
For our results with multidimensional policies, it is important to note here that the
ranking of candidates by individual voters allows us to escape the well-known agenda-setting
cycle (the "Condorcet paradox"). Such a cycle, which arises when any candidate could be
defeated in a pairwise majority voting competition, leads to massive indeterminacy and non-
existence of a political equilibrium. The agenda-setting cycle will have a bite if the rankings
of the candidates for all groups are unique: no group occupies the same ranked position more
than once. However, this does not arise here, because, in all equilibria, some political groups
have a common enemy. That is, because they will never vote for the least-preferred candidate
(the "common" enemy), the voting cycle breaks down to determinate policies above, albeit
their multiplicity. This occurs when voters agree on who is the least-preferred candidate
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and act together to block her from winning the election. The literature typically avoids
the Condorcet paradox by restricting political preferences with some ad hoc assumptions.
For our case, the preferences induced from economic assumption lead to the escape of the
Condorcet paradox. For discussions on agenda-setting cycle, see Drazen (2000, page 71-72),
and Persson and Tabellini (2000, page 29-31).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we built a dynamic politico-economic model featuring three groups of vot-
ers: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees. The model features both inter- and
intra-generational redistribution, resembling a welfare state. The skilled workers are net
contributors to the welfare state whereas the unskilled workers and old retirees are net ben-
eﬁciaries. When the skilled cohort grows rapidly, it may be necessary to bring in unskilled
migrants to counter balance the expanding size of the skilled group.
The native-born young, whether skilled or unskilled, beneﬁt from letting in migrants of
all types, because their high birth rates can help increase the tax base in the next period.
In this respect, skilled migrants help the welfare state more than unskilled migrants, to the
extent that the oﬀspring resemble their parents with respect to skill. On the other hand,
more migrants in the present will strengthen the political power of the young in the next
period who, relatively to the old, are less keen on the generosity of the welfare state. In this
respect, unskilled migrants pose less of a threat to the generosity of the welfare state then
skilled migrants.
6 Appendix: Elements of Strategic Voting with Mul-
tiple Groups
The initial motivation for our politico-economic setup is the class of models with citizen-
candidate structure. Before the introduction of the citizen-candidate structure, earlier mod-
els in the ﬁelds of public choice and political economics utilize heavily the Downsian candidate
setup that leads to the result of platform convergence of the candidates (Downs (1957)). The
model assumes purely oﬃce-motivated candidates competing for a single oﬃce post. The
competition to win the election will drive the policy platforms of all the candidates to the
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bliss point of the median voters, trying to attract as many votes as possible.13 Thus the
campaign among the candidates boils down to pursuing what drives the preference of the
median voter and what may shift the distribution of voters. Moreover, the complete conver-
gence in platforms does not seem to be observed in practice in most elections. Furthermore,
candidates must arise from the citizen body and citizens are presumed to have some pref-
erences for the policy chosen, regardless of the number of voters. Hence, assuming that
candidates are only oﬃce-motivated misses out key policy determinants of voting models.
The citizen-candidate model stands on the other end of the spectrum. First studied by Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), the citizen-candidate model seeks
to endogenize the candidates’ selection from within the body of the citizens, and how the
policy is ultimately determined.
However, due to the richness of strategic choices in the model, the citizen-candidate model
is not easily applicable for applied research. In particular, the model suﬀers from massive
multiplicity of equilibria, even in a static setting. For those seeking a dynamic politico-
economic framework, the citizen-candidate proves formidable. In a subsequent work, Besley
and Coate (1998) have extended the static model to a two-period setting. Anything beyond
two-period must face exponentiated complexity. All in all, the citizen-candidate model is
appropriate for an analysis focussing on a small-scale election, and possibly static. Therefore,
it remains just a motivation for our exposition in this chapter, as we have adapted the model
into an easily applicable version.
6.1 Many candidates
Consider an economy with a continuum of citizens, normalizing the population size to a
unit. The citizens are divided into N groups, indexed by i ∈ {1,2,...,N}, and each has
am a s so fωi ≥ 0,w h e r e
PN
i=1 ωi =1 .W e i m a g i n e N to be relatively small. This means
that, with a large population, people with similar interests often get grouped together. This
setup abstracts from the possibility that one individual may belong to more than one group,
sharing many interests.14
To highlight the mechanics of the model, suppose that the voters must collectively choose
a one-dimensional policy (that is, p ∈ P = R).15 We assume that any two citizens belonging
13The politico-economic models we employed in the preceding chapters were in this spirit too.
14This shortfall, nonetheless, is common even in literature concerning itself primarily with interest groups’
inﬂuence.
15
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to the same group will have identical preference over the policy. The representative citizen
from group i has a preference deﬁned over the policy space, represented by the utility function
vi(p). These preferences are "singled-peaked" and we let p∗
i denotes group i’s preferred policy.
We assume that there are N candidates running for oﬃce representing directly the interest
o ft h eg r o u pt h e yb e l o n gt o .W ed e n o t ew i t hj ∈ {1,...,N} the identity of the candidates.
This is fully known to all voters. Only one candidate is present from each group. We assume
that, if the candidate representing group j wins the election, the implemented policy will be
p∗
j. Under plurality rule, candidates who receive the most votes win.
Each citizen has a single vote that can be cast for a candidate. In particular, because
voters from the same group have identical preference, they will vote identically.16
Let ei ∈ {1,...,N} denote the vote casted by voters of group i. How each chooses to vote
depends on her preference and what we allow them to consider while voting. We consider
two canonical voting behaviors: sincere and strategic.
6.2 Sincere Voting
Voting sincerely is the simpler of the two. Under sincere voting behavior, voters will vote
for candidates j ∈ {1,...,N} whose policy platform maximizes their utility, that is
e e












We can denote the voting vector as e e∗ =
¡
e e1∗,...,e eN∗¢
. Under this voting behavior, voters
belonging to group i will vote for candidate representing their group. That is e ei∗ = i.T h e
winner of the election will be decided purely by the size of the groups. Under plurality rule,
the winning candidate will come from the group with the largest size, as reﬂected by ωi.
In the special case with two groups (N =2 ), then the winning candidate will be represent
the median voter of the economy. However, as N gets larger, it is no longer the case that
the winning candidate will represent the preference of the median voter. When there are
more fractions in the economy, and no collusion is allowed (that is, assuming everyone votes
sincerely), the preference of the largest group in the economy will dictate the implemented
policy.
Besley and Coate (1997) studies a more general environment with possible multi-dimensional policy space.
16We allow no abstentions within the model. Abstention can be built directly into voting choices. Depending
on the context, however, it may appear unrealistic because, if one voter from a group abstains, all members
of the same group must accordingly abstain.
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6.3 Strategic Voting
Strategic voting relaxes the assumption of sincere voting. People are no longer required to
vote for the candidate they like most, but rather they take into account the probability of
that candidate winning the election. A voter is said to be voting strategically if she votes
for the candidate with a policy platform that maximizes her.expected utility, where the
expectation is taken over all the candidates and their probability of winning the election.
Moreover, the votes must be consistent with the induced probability of winning of each
candidate. Formally, voting decisions e∗ =( e1∗,...,e N∗) form a voting equilibrium17 if
e

















for i ∈ {1,...,N},w h e r ePj(ei,e∗
−i) denotes the probability that candidate j ∈ {1,...,N}
will win given the voting decisions, and e∗
−i is the optimal voting decisions of other groups
that is not i. Thus we also require that each vote cast by each group is a best-response to the
votes by the other groups. In addition, this also means that the representative voter of each
group must take into the account the pivotal power of her vote, because the entire group will
also vote accordingly. After the election, the votes are tallied by adding up the size of each
group that have chosen to vote for the candidate. The candidate with the most votes wins
the election and gets to implement her ideal set of policies. The winning probability quantity,
Pj(ei,e∗
−i), must be determined endogenously from the voting vector and the groups’ weight.
Lastly, we deﬁne a political equilibrium to consists of two vectors, e∗ and p∗, where the latter
is the vector listing the policies preferred by every candidate.
It is important to contrast the strategic voting scenario with the sincere counterpart.
We do this by a couple of examples, which will also demonstrate how the probability a
candidate would win is determined, Pj(e∗). Under sincere voting, voters assume that the
policy of their most-preferred candidate will be implemented with probability one, while
under strategic voting, the probability depends on how other groups vote. A special case
arises when a certain group form more than 50% of the population. In this case, the winning
candidate, who will also represent the preference of the median, will belong to this group,
irrespective of the voting proﬁles of the other groups. Therefore, the probability that its
candidate will win is 1. One can easily construct other examples with diﬀerent conclusions.
17The original deﬁnition of this voting equilibrium is due to Besley and Coate (1997).
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For example, let N =3 ,a n dωi = 1
4, 1
3, 5
12 for i =1 ,2,3 respectively. No one group consists
of more than 50% of the population; group 3 is the largest. However, if group 1 and 2
both dislike the policy preferred by group 3, they could collude to surpass 50% and win the
election. The implemented policies will be decided by the voting equilibrium. If collusion
means voters from group 1 and group 2 both vote from group 2’s candidate, the ideal policy
of group 2 will be implemented in equilibrium. The probability of winning for candidates
representing group 1 and 2 are P1(e∗)=0and P2(e∗)=1 . Likewise, group 1 and 2 could
both vote for group 1’s representative candidate, hence resulting in policy preferred by group
1 in equilibrium. In this case, the probability of winning for candidates representing group
1 and 2 are reversed P1(e∗)=1and P2(e∗)=0 . By either collusions, the preferred policy
of the largest group, group 3, will be blocked in equilibrium. These two voting equilibrium
will generate P3(e∗)=0 .
Note that a rule for a tie breaker should be deﬁned. That is, if two candidates receive
the same amount of votes, how will this be resolved. Besley and Coate (1997) proposes
equal probability across all leading candidates. Alternatively, one can also assign some other
arbitrary rules, such as the candidate belonging the larger group always win or the candidate
with a smaller group index wins. Whichever rule one chooses, it should complement the
analysis underlying the usage of the model.
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